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Abstract
We investigate unconditional security for message authentication protocols that are designed
using two-channel cryptography. We look at both noninteractive message authentication proto-
cols (NIMAPs) and interactive message authentication protocols (IMAPs). We provide a new
proof of nonexistence of nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs. This proof consists of a
combinatorial counting argument and is much shorter than the previous proof by Wang et al.,
which was based on probability distribution arguments. Further, we propose a generalization of
an unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP due to Naor, Segev and Smith. With a careful choice
of parameters, our scheme improves that of Naor et al. Our scheme is very close to optimal for
most parameter situations of practical interest.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on using two-channel cryptography to design unconditionally secure message
authentication protocols suitable for networks consisting of devices with limited resources. In
particular, we look at noninteractive message authentication protocols (NIMAPs) and interactive
message authentication protocols (IMAPs). Previous protocols and proofs are reviewed and some
are improved.
Standard models of public-key cryptography and secret-key cryptography have addressed the
problem of message authentication by means of assuming availability of public-key infrastructures
or secure channels. In some scenarios, however, assuming the traditional settings of public-key
and secret-key cryptography might not be practical and, indeed, using these techniques may be
very costly. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), wireless sensor networks (WSN), and pervasive
networks in general are examples of scenarios in which traditional cryptographic protocols may not
be suitable, or not even possible, to implement.
In search of a solution to this problem, researchers realized that when the devices come in close
geographic proximity of each other, it is possible to make use of a manual channel, as well as the
usual wireless channel. Instances of the manual channel are typically more expensive to operate
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1compared to the wireless channel. However, they provide some level of security. For example,
the channel may provide authenticity of short messages, but may not be conﬁdential. The aim
is to employ a (broadband and insecure) wireless channel and a (somewhat secure and narrow-
band) manual channel at the same time and attain a security objective, message authentication
for instance. This motivated the term two-channel cryptography. In 1984, Rivest and Shamir [18]
ﬁrst proposed incorporating human participation in authentication protocols. However, this idea
did not receive serious attention from researchers until very recently.
1.1 Communication Model of Two-channel Cryptography
We ﬁrst describe the communication model of two-channel cryptography, where it is assumed that
two channels are accessible for communication: an insecure broadband channel, denoted by “→”,
and an authenticated narrow-band channel, denoted by “⇒”. Communication over the authenti-
cated channel is usually more expensive and less convenient. Hence, the messages sent over the
authenticated channel are usually much shorter than those sent over the insecure channel. The
goal of two-channel cryptography is, then, to achieve a certain cryptographic objective by means
of the two channels, while optimizing the cost.
An insecure wireless channel is an example of the broadband channel. The narrow-band channel
is usually used to send a short string. Instances of the narrow-band channel include voice-over-
internet-protocol (VoIP), data imprinting or data comparison by a user, near ﬁeld communication
(NFC), infrared (IR), laser, or visible light between two devices.
The following are common assumptions on what an adversary can and cannot do in two-channel
cryptography.
• The adversary has full control over the broadband channel. That is, the adversary can listen
to any messages sent over the broadband channel, modify the messages sent via this channel,
stall a message from being delivered, and insert a new message into this channel at any time.
• On the other hand, we assume that the adversary’s control over the authenticated channel
is limited. In particular, the adversary cannot modify the information transmitted over the
authenticated channel, i.e., data integrity is ensured in this channel. However, it may be
possible to read, delay or remove a message from this channel.
Moreover, the authenticated channel is equipped with user authenticating features such that
the recipient of the information can be sure about who sent it. In other words, an adversary cannot
initiate a ﬂow over this channel. On the other hand, the adversary is able to replay a previous ﬂow
sent through this channel. However, replaying a previous ﬂow sent by Alice to Bob is not going
to help Eve, when she wants to deceive another party, Charlie. That is, when Bob receives an
authenticated ﬂow, he can check if he was the intended recipient or not.
1.2 Two-channel Cryptography Applications
Two-channel cryptography techniques have several applications, especially in constrained environ-
ments where secure channels or trusted infrastructures do not exist or are very costly to provide.
Moreover, these techniques are useful in networks that are composed of constrained devices which
cannot handle heavy computations such as public-key computations.
2With new technological advancements in miniaturizing devices and the emerging smart homes
and buildings projects [2], the problem of designing light-weight cryptographic protocols for low-end
devices has attracted a lot of attention both in the academic community and in industry. In scenar-
ios such as personal area networks (PAN) [6] and telemedicine (remote health care where medical
personnel can monitor the patients from a distance) [3], where the devices are naturally attended
by users, the idea of employing the manual channel is even more appealing. This approach is es-
pecially attractive when it enables researchers to design more cost-eﬃcient and easy-to-implement
protocols.
Another important application is disaster recovery, when a trusted infrastructure is compro-
mised. The use of two-channel cryptography allows for temporary, yet speedy, relief before the
infrastructure is fully recovered. Full recovery usually takes a lot longer and security providers
need to be vigilant in the meantime.
1.3 Message Authentication in Ad hoc Networks
The problem of authentication is an important aspect of secure communication. Typically, com-
municating parties would like to be assured of the authenticity of information they obtain via
potentially insecure channels.
An ad hoc network is a network where some of the users are part of the network only for
a short period of time. For practical reasons, it should be possible to quickly add new users
to an ad hoc network. In this network, like any other network, it is desirable to have message
authentication. However, assuming traditional settings might not be practical. For example, a
public-key infrastructure may not exist; secure channels might not be present; communication
bandwidth may be severely limited. Consider the following scenario presented in the literature [1]
which motives this setting: a traveller in an airport lounge would like to print a sensitive document
from his or her laptop to one of the many printers set up in the airport lounge. The lounge does
not have a secure universal naming infrastructure for the printers. The traveller wants to choose
a particular printer and make sure the document gets printed by that particular printer (and no
other printer), using the insecure wireless channel. The traveller’s laptop and a printer need to be
securely introduced while there is no public-key infrastructure or secure channel available.
In order to overcome these diﬃculties in an ad hoc network and still be able to provide message
authentication, one can employ two-channel cryptographic techniques when designing protocols
[1, 6, 5, 8, 11, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22].
1.4 Attack Model
We focus on message authentication protocols which deploy both narrow-band and broadband
channels between a claimant Alice and a veriﬁer Bob. Alice chooses a message M ∈ M, where M
denotes the space of all acceptable messages, and sends it to Bob using a NIMAP or an IMAP.
At the end of the protocol, Bob either outputs (Alice, M′), where M′ ∈ M, or he rejects. In the
absence of an active adversary, denoted as Eve, the message M sent from Alice should be recovered
by Bob, making him accept and output (Alice, M). This message M could be a key that is going
to be used for further communication. Eve’s goal is to make Bob accept a message M′ along with
the identity of Alice, when Alice has never sent M′.
The attack model assumed in this context is the adaptive chosen plaintext attack (ACPA) model
[7]. The ACPA model consists of two phases: an information gathering stage and a deception stage.
3In the information gathering stage, Eve adaptively makes Alice send M1,M2,...,Mq to Bob, where
q is an integer termed the querying complexity. In the deception stage, Eve sends a single message
M′, along with the identity of Alice, to Bob, where M′ / ∈ {M1,M2,...,Mq}. Eve is successful if Bob
accepts M′ along with Alice’s identity. The computational complexity of the adversary before the
deception starts, i.e. during the information gathering stage, is referred to as oﬄine computational
complexity, whereas online computational complexity refers to the computational complexity of the
adversary during the deception stage.
1.5 Interactive versus Noninteractive Protocols
A message authentication protocol may or may not require online interaction with Bob. There
are numerous noninteractive as well as interactive message authentication protocols that have been
considered in the literature [1, 6, 5, 8, 11, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22].
In a NIMAP, all ﬂows are initiated by Alice. She sends some information over the broadband
channel and some information over the narrow-band channel. Since there is no ﬂow being initiated
by Bob, the order in which Alice’s ﬂows are sent is irrelevant. As a result, we can combine all ﬂows
sent over the broadband channel into one single ﬂow and, similarly, we can combine all ﬂows sent
over the narrow-band channel into one single ﬂow. Hence, without loss of generality, we obtain a
typical ﬂow structure of a NIMAP as depicted in Fig. 1.
Alice Bob
Input (M, Bob)
... − − − − →
... = = = ⇒
Output (Alice, M′) or reject.
Figure 1: A Schematic NIMAP
On the other hand, the ﬂow structure of an IMAP can be more complicated. There is at least
one ﬂow initiated by Bob and, hence, the order in which ﬂows are initiated matters. There may
be more than one narrow-band ﬂow. The authenticated channel may be bidirectional which means
Bob can initiate a ﬂow over the narrow-band channel as well. Illustrated in Fig. 2 is a possible ﬂow
structure of an IMAP. In this particular ﬂow structure, the ﬁrst ﬂow is initiated by Alice on the
broadband channel which is followed by a response from Bob on the same channel. Then, Alice
sends one more ﬂow over the broadband channel and her authenticated ﬂow over the narrow-band
channel.
NIMAPs are particularly interesting because they do not require the veriﬁer to be online. On the
other hand, interaction sometimes allows for more eﬃcient protocols. Furthermore, some objectives
may not be achievable in the noninteractive setting, but can be realized in an interactive setting.
1.6 Computational versus Unconditional Security
In the unconditional security setting, the adversary is assumed to have unlimited computational
resources. In the computational security setting, on the other hand, the computational power
of the adversary is bounded (typically, it is assumed to be polynomial-time, as a function of a
4Alice Bob
Input (M, Bob) ... − − − − →
... ← − − − −
... − − − − →
... = = = ⇒ Output (Alice, M′) or reject.
Figure 2: A Sample Schematic IMAP
certain security parameter). Moreover, the querying complexity of the adversary is also bounded
in the computational security settings. In order for a protocol to be considered secure, the best
currently-known methods to defeat a system or protocol should exceed the computational resources
of the adversary by a comfortable margin. In case of computationally secure NIMAPs or IMAPs,
a successful adversary is reduced (in the sense of a Turing reduction) to an attacker against a
well-known system or problem which is proven, or widely believed, to be secure.
1.7 Contributions of this paper
We prove that nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs do not exist. Wang and Safavi-Naini [22]
ﬁrst proved this nonexistence result using probability distribution arguments. We prove the same
result using a simple counting argument which is much shorter. Further, we propose a generalization
of an unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP due to Naor, Segev and Smith [14, 15]. With a careful
choice of parameters, our scheme improves that of Naor et al. In fact, for most parameter situations
of practical interest, our scheme requires an authenticated tag that is only 10 bits longer than the
theoretical minimum proven in [14, 15].
2 On Unconditionally Secure NIMAPs
In the study of unconditionally secure NIMAPs, we assume the existence of adversaries who have
access to unbounded amounts of time and resources. In this section, we show that the only NIMAPs
which are secure in the presence of such unbounded adversaries are trivial protocols. In other
words, the entire message has to be sent over the authenticated channel in order for a NIMAP to
be unconditionally secure. In other words, nontrivial NIMAPs that are unconditionally secure do
not exist. This result was ﬁrst proved by Wang and Safavi-Naini [22] using probability distribution
arguments. We provide a new proof in the form of a simple counting argument.
2.1 Wang and Safavi-Naini’s Proof
Wang and Safavi-Naini [22] ﬁrst showed the impossibility of designing nontrivial unconditionally
secure NIMAPs. They used the following model to describe the unconditionally secure NIMAP:
The information theoretic NIMAP model: The sender S (Alice) sends the message M and a
value x over the insecure public channel, and a tag t over the manual channel. The receiver R
(Bob) decides whether or not to accept M as authentic from S.
5Wang and Safavi-Naini showed that unconditionally secure NIMAPs do not exist without prior
shared secrets between the sender and receiver, and without requirements such as stall-free on the
narrow-band channel1, unless the whole message is transmitted over the narrow-band channel. This
results in a trivial protocol where the authenticated channel has enough bandwidth to transmit the
whole message.
They suppose |M| > |t| and propose an attack. First, they show that there deﬁnitely exists
some other message M′ such that M′ can be authenticated under some x′, possibly diﬀerent from
x, and the same tag t. Now, the adversary, on observing the authentication transcripts (M,x,t),
replaces M and x with M′ and x′.
They further note that the adversary can mount this attack online by removing M and x from
the broadband channel and delaying t on the narrow-band channel until she ﬁnds an appropriate
M′ and x′. Then, she sends M′ and x′ over the broadband channel and let t be transmitted over
the narrow-band channel right after.
In order to formally prove the eﬀectiveness of their attack, for example when proving the
existence of appropriate M′ and x′, they use probability distribution arguments involving Shannon
entropies.
2.2 A Simple Counting Argument
We now present a much shorter and simpler proof of nonexistence of nontrivial NIMAPs. Our proof
is based on a counting argument.
We use the same model used by Wang and Safavi-Naini [22] and deﬁne M to be the set of all
possible messages to be authenticated and R to be the set of all possible strings that could be sent
on the ﬁrst ﬂow along with a possible message. Moreover, we let S be the set of all authenticating
tags that are sent over the authenticated channel. An instance of a NIMAP in this model is as
follows. A message M ∈ M is to be authenticated and it is sent over the broadband channel along
with some information r ∈ R. Later, an authenticating tag s ∈ S is sent over the narrow-band
channel. Figure 3 depicts this NIMAP.
Alice Bob
Input (M, Bob)
M,r
− − − →
s = = = ⇒
Output (Alice, M′) or reject.
Figure 3: A General NIMAP
Let V be the set of all transcripts which result in Bob accepting a message, that is
V = {(M,r,s) : Bob accepts the triple (M,r,s)}.
Note that V is public knowledge and a computationally unbounded adversary can ﬁnd or store V
ahead of time.
1In a stall-free channel, once a message is sent, it is either received by the recipient right away or it is never
received.
6If |M| ≤ |S|, then there exists a trivial NIMAP where the whole message is transmitted over
the authenticated channel. We assume that |M| > |S| to consider nontrivial NIMAPs. For every
tag s ∈ S, we let Ms be the set of all messages such that there exists some r in which (M,r,s)
results in an acceptance by Bob. In other words,
Ms := {M : (M,r,s) ∈ V for some r}.
We let U be the set of all tags that can authenticate only one message; that is,
U := {s : |Ms| = 1}.
Furthermore, we let MU be the union of all Ms such that s ∈ U. In other words,
MU =
[
s∈U
Ms.
Since |U| ≤ |S| < |M| and |U| = |MU|, we obtain that |MU| < |M|. Hence, there exists an
M ∈ M \ MU such that, for any (M,r,s) ∈ V, there exists (M′,r′,s) ∈ V with M  = M′.
The attack consists of Eve choosing any M ∈ M\MU and giving it to Alice. Note that Eve is
computationally unbounded and can ﬁnd such an M. Later, when Eve receives (M,r,s) from Alice,
she replaces it with the appropriate (M′,r′,s), that we know exists. This attack, which succeeds
with probability equal to 1, is depicted in Fig. 4.
Alice Eve Bob
M ← − − −
M,r
− − − →
s = = = ⇒
M′,r′
− − − →
s = = = ⇒ Verify (M′,r′,s) ∈ V.
Figure 4: An Attack Against the General NIMAP
We have proven the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. If the message space M of a NIMAP has greater cardinality than the tag space S,
then Eve can deceive Bob with probability equal to 1.
Corollary 2.2. Nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs do not exist.
The usual attack model allows Eve to select the message M that Alice will transmit to Bob. It
is also interesting to consider a weaker attack model in which Alice chooses the message M ∈ M
uniformly at random. We have the following new result.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose we have a NIMAP where Alice chooses the message M ∈ M uniformly
at random, and the message space M has greater cardinality than the tag space S. Then Eve can
deceive Bob with probability at least 1 − |S|/|M|.
7Proof. The analysis in this attack model is similar to the usual model. As before, Eve can suc-
cessfully deceive Bob whenever M ∈ M \ MU. We showed above that |MU| ≤ |S|. Under the
assumption that Alice chooses the message M ∈ M uniformly at random, it follows that
Prob[M ∈ M \ MU] ≥ 1 −
|S|
|M|
.
Therefore Eve can deceive Bob in this weaker attack model with probability at least 1−|S|/|M|.
3 An Unconditionally Secure 3-Round IMAP
Naor, Segev and Smith [14, 15] proposed an unconditionally secure IMAP, with k rounds, using
evaluation of polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds, for every integer k. To authenticate λ-bit message in k
rounds, they require the length of the authenticated string to be about 2log(1/ǫ) + 2log(k−1) λ +
O(1), where ǫ is the probability of success of the adversary. The length of the authenticated string
over the narrow-band channel is 2log(1/ǫ) + O(1) when k = logλ. When k = 3, the length is
2log(1/ǫ) + 2loglogλ+ O(1). (Note that all logarithms are to the base 2.) Moreover, they proved
that their protocol is close to optimal by proving a lower bound of 2log(1/ǫ) − 6 on the required
length of the authenticated string, independent of the length of the message.
In this paper, we focus on unconditionally secure IMAPs with three rounds. These are probably
the IMAPs of greatest practical interest, since the communication structure is as simple as possible.
We present a construction for 3-round IMAPs based on ǫ-∆ universal hash families. This IMAP
includes the Naor-Segev-Smith 3-round IMAP as a special case. We give a security analysis of our
construction and analyze how to minimize the deception probability by choosing the hash families
carefully. It turns out that the best IMAPs produced by this approach use hash families based on
Reed-Solomon codes (essentially, the approach of Naor-Segev-Smith) but with diﬀerent, optimized
parameters. If a ν-bit authentication tag is sent in the third round, then we can achieve a deception
probability of 2−ν/2+2 for most parameter situations of practical interest (more precisely, whenever
the message to be authenticated is not too long; see Theorem 3.6).
3.1 Hash Family Preliminaries
We will make essential use of certain types of hash families. The notion of an ǫ-∆ universal hash
family (also known as an ǫ-∆U hash family) was ﬁrst given in Stinson [20], generalizing the idea
of ǫ-almost xor universal hash families due to Krawczyk [9]. In this section, we review some old
results and prove some new results that will be used in the rest of the paper. We begin with the
following deﬁnition for ǫ-∆U hash families.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Suppose that a hash family H has keyspace K, and hK : X → Y for all k ∈ K.
We assume that (Y,+) is an abelian group. The hash family H is an ǫ-∆U hash family if for all
choices of M,M′ ∈ X and all s ∈ Y, it holds that
Pr[hk(M) − hk(M′) = s] ≤ ǫ,
where the probability is computed over a randomly chosen key k ∈ K. Equivalently,
|{k ∈ K : hk(M) − hk(M′) = s}| ≤ ǫ|K|.
We will denote the hash family H as an ǫ-∆U(N;n,m) hash family if N = |K|, n = |X|, and
m = |Y|.
8We next present some bounds and constructions on ǫ-∆U hash families.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose there exists an ǫ-∆U(N;n,m) hash family. Then ǫ ≥ max{1/m,1/N}.
Proof. It is shown in [20, Theorem 4.1] that ǫ ≥ 1/m, so we need only show that ǫ ≥ 1/N. Let the
hypothesized hash family H have keyspace K, and assume hk : X → Y for all k ∈ K. Let M,M′ ∈ X,
M  = M′. Deﬁne YM,M′ = {hk(M) − hk(M′) : k ∈ K}. Observe that |YM,M′| ≤ |K| = N. For any
y ∈ YM,M′, let
ay = |{k ∈ K : hk(M) − hk(M′) = y}|.
Then ay ≤ ǫN for all y ∈ YM,M′, so X
y∈YM,M′
ay ≤ ǫN2.
On the other hand, X
y∈YM,M′
ay = N.
It therefore follows that N ≤ ǫN2, so ǫ ≥ 1/N.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose there exists an ǫ-∆U(N;n,m) hash family, where ǫ = 1/m. Then N ≥ n.
Proof. See [20, Theorem 4.3].
We now present a class of hash families based on Reed-Solomon codes. These hash families were
ﬁrst described in [20, Theorem 4.8]. The IMAP of Naor, Segev and Smith [14, 15] makes essential
use of these hash families.
Lemma 3.3. [20] Suppose q is a prime power and 1 ≤ t ≤ q + 1. Deﬁne K = Fq, X = (Fq)t and
Y = Fq. For any k ∈ K and any (x1,...,xt) ∈ X, deﬁne
hk(x1,...,xt) =
t−1 X
i=1
xiki.
Then RS(q,t) = {hk : k ∈ K} is a t
q-∆U(q;qt,q) hash family.
3.2 The IMAP
Figure 5 illustrates our generalization of the protocol proposed by Naor et al. In our protocol, we
use the following notation and assumptions:
1. Let M be the set of all possible messages, and denote M0 = M.
2. We use two families of hash functions, H1 and H2. For i = 1,2, Hi is an ǫi-∆U(Ni;ni,mi)
hash family.
3. For i = 1,2, let the keyspace of Hi be denoted by Ki. For every ki ∈ Ki, the hash function
hki : Mi−1 → Xi.
4. X1 × K1 ⊆ M1 (hence n2 ≥ N1m1).
9Alice Bob
Input (MA, Bob)
Deﬁne MA
0 = MA
Choose sA
1 ∈ X1 uniformly at random
MA
0 ,sA
1 − − − − − − →
Receive MB
0 ,sB
1
Choose kB
1 ∈ K1 uniformly at random
Compute xB
1 = hkB
1
(MB
0 ) + sB
1
Deﬁne MB
1 = (xB
1 ,kB
1 )
Choose sB
2 ∈ X2 uniformly at random
sB
2 ,kB
1 ← − − − − − −
Receive sA
2 ,kA
1
Compute xA
1 = hkA
1
(MA
0 ) + sA
1
Deﬁne MA
1 = (xA
1 ,kA
1 )
Choose k2 ∈ K2 uniformly at random
Compute x2 = hk2(MA
1 ) + sA
2
Deﬁne M2 = (x2,k2)
M2 = = = = = = ⇒
Receive M2 = (x2,k2)
Compute xB
2 = hk2(MB
1 ) + sB
2
Output (Alice, MB
0 ) if x2 = xB
2
Reject, otherwise.
Figure 5: A Generalization of Naor-Segev-Smith IMAP
5. Deﬁne X2 ×K2 = M2. The number of bits sent over the authenticated channel is log|M2| =
log|K2| + log|X2|.
There are two hash function computations performed in this protocol. First, x1 = hk1(M0).
Then M1 = (x1,K1) and x2 = hk2(M1). Finally, M2 = (x2,K2) is sent over the authenticated
channel. Observe that Alice and Bob both compute x1 and x2 during the protocol.
3.3 Possible Attacks Against a 3-round Protocol
Before we analyze the protocol presented in Figure 5, we discuss the possible attacks we must
consider. Let M be the set of all messages, and let x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, and s ∈ S, for some sets X,Y,
and S. Figure 6 depicts a 3-round generic IMAP (3GIMAP).
Gehrman [4] looked at diﬀerent possible attacks against a generic k-round protocol and proved
that there are in total
￿k+1
k+1
2
￿
distinct attacks. He used the following notation to label these attacks.
A ﬂow initiated by the adversary is labelled as A if it sent to Alice, and, similarly, a ﬂow sent by
the adversary is labelled as B if the recipient is Bob. According to his result, there are
￿4
2
￿
= 6
possible attacks against a three round protocol, namely, AABB, ABBA, BABA, ABAB, BBAA,
and BAAB attacks.
The last ﬂow of 3GIMAP is an authenticated ﬂow sent by Alice to Bob. According to the
communication model of two-channel cryptography, the adversary can only replay this last ﬂow.
As a result, the only possible attacks against 3GIMAP are the ones that end with a ﬂow sent to
Bob, namely AABB, ABAB, and BAAB. These attacks are depicted in Figures 7, 8, and 9.
10Alice Bob
Input (MA, Bob)
MA,xA
− − − − − − →
Receive MB,xB
yB
← − − − − − −
Receive yA
s = = = = = = ⇒ Output (Alice, MB) or reject.
Figure 6: 3GIMAP
Alice Eve Bob
MA
← − − − − − −
MA,xA
− − − − − − →
MB,xB
− − − − − − →
yA
← − − − − − −
yB
← − − − − − −
s = = = = = = ⇒ s = = = = = = ⇒ Output (Alice, MB) or reject.
Figure 7: Attack of Type ABAB
Alice Eve Bob
MB,xB
− − − − − − →
yB
← − − − − − −
MA
← − − − − − −
MA,xA
− − − − − − →
yA
← − − − − − −
s = = = = = = ⇒ s = = = = = = ⇒ Output (Alice, MB) or reject.
Figure 8: Attack of Type BAAB
3.4 Analysis of the IMAP
Now we are in a position to analyze the attacks on the protocol presented in Figure 5. In a successful
attack, it is required that MA
0  = MB
0 and x2 = xB
2 . We distinguish two cases:
(i) MA
1 = MB
1
(ii) MA
1  = MB
1 .
11Alice Eve Bob
MA
← − − − − − −
MA,xA
− − − − − − →
yA
← − − − − − −
s = = = = = = ⇒
MB,xB
− − − − − − →
yB
← − − − − − −
s = = = = = = ⇒ Output (Alice, MB) or reject.
Figure 9: Attack of Type AABB
In case (i), we have kA
1 = kB
1 = k1 (say), and xA
1 = xB
1 , so
hk1(MA
0 ) + sA
1 = hk1(MB
0 ) + sB
1 ,
which simpliﬁes to
hk1(MA
0 ) − hk1(MB
0 ) = sB
1 − sA
1 . (1)
In case (ii), we have x2 = xB
2 , and it follows that
hk2(MA
1 ) − hk2(MB
1 ) = sB
2 − sA
2 , (2)
where MA
1  = MB
1 .
We now analyze each of the three attacks.
ABAB attack
Case (i) Here, MA
0 ,MB
0 ,sA
1 and sB
1 are ﬁxed before k1 is chosen by Bob. Therefore, the probability
that (1) holds is at most ǫ1, because H1 is an ǫ1-∆U hash family.
Case (ii) Here, MA
1 ,MB
1 ,sA
2 and sB
2 are ﬁxed before k2 is chosen by Alice. Therefore, the proba-
bility that (2) holds is at most ǫ2, because H2 is an ǫ2-∆U hash family.
The probability of success of an ABAB attack is therefore at most ǫ1 + ǫ2.
BAAB attack
Case (i) Here, k1,MA
0 ,MB
0 and sB
1 are ﬁxed before sA
1 is chosen by Alice. Therefore, the proba-
bility that (1) holds is 1/|X1|.
Case (ii) Here, MA
1 ,MB
1 ,sA
2 and sB
2 are ﬁxed before k2 is chosen by Alice. Therefore, the proba-
bility that (2) holds is ǫ2.
The probability of success of a BAAB attack is therefore at most 1/|X1| + ǫ2.
12AABB attack
Case (i) Eve has to choose kA
1 before Bob chooses kB
1 . The probability that kA
1 = kB
1 is 1/|K1|.
Case (ii) Here, k2,MA
1 ,MB
1 and sA
2 are ﬁxed before sB
2 is chosen by Bob. Therefore, the proba-
bility that (2) holds is 1/|X2|.
The probability of success of an AABB attack is therefore at most 1/|K1| + 1/|X2|.
Summary
If we consider all three attacks, we see that Eve succeeds with probability
max
￿
ǫ1 + ǫ2,
1
|X1|
+ ǫ2,
1
|K1|
+
1
|X2|
￿
.
It follows from Lemma 3.1 that ǫ1 ≥ 1/|X1|, ǫ1 ≥ 1/|K1| and ǫ2 ≥ 1/|X2|. Therefore,
max
￿
ǫ1 + ǫ2,
1
|X1|
+ ǫ2,
1
|K1|
+
1
|X2|
￿
= ǫ1 + ǫ2.
Therefore, we have proven the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose there exists an ǫi-∆U(Ni;ni,mi) hash family, for i = 1,2, where n2 ≥
N1m1. Then the protocol presented in Figure 5 manually authenticates an log2 n1-bit message with
an (log2 N2+log2 m2)-bit tag, where the deception probability of an adversary is at most ǫ ≤ ǫ1+ǫ2.
3.5 Speciﬁc Constructions for Unconditionally Secure IMAPs
The following application of Theorem 3.4 uses the hash families constructed in Lemma 3.3. It is
similar to the construction in [14, 15], specialized to three rounds, but with more general parameters.
Corollary 3.5. Suppose that λ,  and ν are positive integers such that λ >   > ν/2. Then a λ-bit
message can be manually authenticated with a ν-bit tag using a 3-round IMAP in which
ǫ ≤
￿
λ
 
￿
2−µ +
￿
4 
ν
￿
2−ν/2. (3)
Proof. Deﬁne
n1 = 2
µ
l
λ
µ
m
, m1 = 2µ, N1 = 2µ, ǫ1 =
￿
λ
 
￿
2−µ
and
n2 = 2
ν
2⌈
4µ
ν ⌉, m2 = 2ν/2, N2 = 2ν/2, and ǫ2 =
￿
4 
ν
￿
2−ν/2.
The required hash families exist from Lemma 3.3 and it is easy to verify that n2 ≥ 22ν = N1m1.
In our computations, it will be useful to note that we have the following in Corollary 3.5:
• M0 is λ bits in length,
• x1 = hk1(M0) is   bits in length,
13• M1 = (x1,K1) is 2  bits in length,
• x2 = hk2(M1) is ν/2 bits in length, and
• M2 = (x2,K2) is ν bits in length.
The value of   in Corollary 3.5 would be chosen to minimize the resulting value of ǫ. Denote
t = ⌈
4µ
ν ⌉. Observe that   > ν/2, so t > 2.
We will assume that 2  is an integer multiple of the integer value ν/2, and λ is an integer
multiple of  . It follows that 4 /ν is an integer, so we have t = 4 /ν. Writing   = νt/4, we can
express the bound (3) as follows:
ǫ ≤
4λ
νt
2−νt/4 + t2−ν/2. (4)
For ﬁxed λ and ν, denote the right side of (4) by f(t). Recalling that t is an integer, it is possible
to determine the value of t that maximizes f(t) by computing
f(t + 1) − f(t) =
4λ
ν(t + 1)
2−ν(t+1)/4 + (t + 1)2−ν/2 −
￿
4λ
νt
2−νt/4 + t2−ν/2
￿
.
After some simpliﬁcation, it can be veriﬁed that
f(t + 1) ≥ f(t) ⇔ λ ≤
ν 2ν(t−1)/4
4
￿
2ν/4
t − 1
t+1
￿.
It follows that it is optimal to use t = 3 whenever
λ ≤
ν 2ν/2
4
3 2ν/4 − 1
. (5)
When t = 3, we have   = 3ν/4. We want λ to be a multiple of  , so we denote t1 = λ/ . Observing
that $
2ν/2
2ν/4 − 1
%
= 2ν/4,
and using the fact that t1 is an integer, we can reﬁne (5) as follows:
t1 ≤
￿
λ
 
￿
≤
$
2ν/2
2ν/4 − 1
%
= 2ν/4 = 2µ/3.
Table 1 lists the maximum value of λ such that t = 3 is optimal, for various values of ν, along
with the corresponding values of  , t1 and log2 ǫ. We have that t1 = 2ν/4,   = 3ν/4 and λ = νt1.
Observe that log2 ǫ = −ν/2 + 2; this can be veriﬁed algebraically using (4), since
4λ
νt
2−νt/4 + t2−ν/2 = 2ν/4 × 2−3ν/4 + 3 × 2−ν/2 = 2−ν/2+2.
It can be seen that the resulting λ values cover many if not most practical applications of IMAPs.
Summarizing, we have the following.
14Table 1: Parameters for which t = 3 is optimal
λ   ν t1 log2 ǫ
6144 24 32 256 −14
30720 30 40 1024 −18
147456 36 48 4096 −22
688128 42 56 16384 −26
3145728 48 64 65536 −30
14155776 54 72 262144 −34
Theorem 3.6. Suppose λ ≤ 3ν 2ν/4−2. Then a λ-bit message can be manually authenticated with
a ν-bit tag using a 3-round IMAP in which ǫ ≤ 2−ν/2+2.
Remark: The value of ν in Theorem 3.6 can be expressed as ν = 2log(1/ǫ) + 4, which is only 10
bits more than the lower bound ν ≥ 2log(1/ǫ) − 6 proven in [14, 15].
Example 3.1. Suppose we wish to construct a 3-round IMAP with a 48-bit authenticated tag.
Then we take ν = 48 in Theorem 3.6. The deception probability of the IMAP will be at most 2−22
provided that the message to be authenticated is at most 147456 bits in length. The scheme has
  = 36, so the hash family H2 is a 3/224-∆U(224;272,224) hash family. The hash family H1 is an
ǫ1-∆U(236;2λ,236) hash family, where λ ≤ 147456 and ǫ1 = λ
36 2−36 ≤ 2−24. Implementation of
the scheme requires evaluating a polynomial of degree λ/36 over the ﬁeld F236, and a polynomial of
degree 3 over the ﬁeld F224.
Example 3.2. We present an example of the Naor-Segev-Smith scheme. As in the previous exam-
ple, we take λ = 147456 and ǫ = 2−22. We apply the formulas in [15, p. 2414]. Using our notation,
we would obtain
  = ⌈2 + log147456 + 22⌉ = 42
and
ν = 2 ⌈1 + log84 + 22⌉ = 60.
Thus their scheme uses a 60-bit tag whereas a 48-bit tag is suﬃcient in our scheme.
4 Another Unconditionally Secure 3-Round IMAP
as Figure 10 illustrates another unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP. This IMAP requires only
one evaluation of a hash function instead of two. It is most useful in the authentication of relatively
short messages. We use one hash function family, H, which is an ǫ-∆U(N;n,m) hash family. Let
the keyspace of H be denoted by K, and for every k ∈ K, there is a hash function hk : M → X.
The number of bits sent over the authenticated channel is log|K| + log|X|.
In a BAAB attack, Eve is required to set kA = kB, otherwise she will be detected. Eve is
successful if and only if
hkB(MA) + sA = hkB(MB) + sB.
In other words, Eve succeeds if and only if sA = hkB(MB)+ sB −hkB(MA). In the BAAB attack,
sA is randomly chosen by Alice after kB is chosen by Bob, so Eve succeeds with probability 1/|X|.
15Alice Bob
Input (MA, Bob)
Choose sA ∈ X uniformly at random
MA,sA
− − − − − − →
Receive MB,sB
Choose kB ∈ K uniformly at random
kB
← − − − − − −
Receive kA
Compute x = hkA(MA) + sA
Deﬁne M = (x,kA)
M = = = = = = ⇒
Receive M = (x,kA)
Output (Alice, M′) if kA = kB and x = hkB(MB) + sB
Reject, otherwise.
Figure 10: Another 3-Round IMAP
In an AABB attack, on the other hand, Eve ﬁrst obtains the values MA,sA and she has to
guess the key kB ahead of time in order to set kA = kB. Later, she can choose MB and sB such
that hkB(MA) + sA = hkB(MB) + sB. The probability that Eve guesses the right key kB is 1/|K|.
Finally, in an ABAB attack, Eve receives MA,sA and ﬁxes MB,sB before kB is chosen by Bob.
Since kA = kB, Eve is successful in her attack if and only if hkB(MA)−hKB(MB) = sB −sA. Note
that sB − sA is a predetermined ﬁxed value. Hence, since H is an ǫ-∆U hash family, Eve succeeds
with probability at most ǫ.
If we summarize the above three attacks, we see that Eve succeeds with probability
max{ǫ,|X|−1,|K|−1}.
From Lemma 3.1, we have max{ǫ,|X|−1,|K|−1} = ǫ. Therefore we have the following.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose there exists an ǫ-∆U(N;n,m) hash family. Then the protocol presented
in Figure 10 manually authenticates an log2 n-bit message with an (log2 N +log2 m)-bit tag, where
the deception probability of an adversary is at most ǫ.
Using the hash families constructed in Lemma 3.3, we have the following theorem, which is a
corollary of Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose λ ≤ ν(2ν/2−1). Then a λ-bit message can be manually authenticated with
a ν-bit tag using a 3-round IMAP in which the deception probability ǫ ≤ λ/(ν2ν/2−1).
Proof. Let q = 2ν/2 and t = 2λ/ν. Since λ ≤ ν(2ν/2−1), we have that t ≤ 2 × ν(2ν/2−1)/ν = q.
Therefore, Lemma 3.3 establishes the existence of an ǫ-∆U(q;qt,q) hash family, where ǫ = t/q.
Now apply Theorem 4.1. The resulting IMAP authenticates a message of length logqt = tlogq =
(2λ/ν)×(ν/2) = λ with a tag of length 2logq = ν. The deception probability is ǫ = t/q = t/2ν/2 =
(2λ/ν)/2ν/2 = λ/(ν2ν/2−1).
If we wish to have ǫ = 2−ν/2+2, as in Theorem 3.6, then we must take λ ≤ 4ν in Corollary 4.2.
For this range of values of λ, however, we achieve the same security as Theorem 3.6 but we require
only one hash function computation.
165 Conclusion
We proved that nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs do not exist using a simple counting
argument. We also proposed a generalization of an unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP due to
Naor, Segev and Smith [14, 15]. For most parameter situations of practical interest, our scheme
requires an authenticated tag that is only 10 bits longer than the theoretical minimum proven in
[14, 15].
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